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1	  
RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY, EDUCATION, AND THE “CRISIS” IN STATE NEUTRALITY 
Benjamin L. Berger* 
The classroom has become a principal site for contemporary 
debates about the meaning of secularism and the management of religious 
difference.  This is so across a variety of national traditions, and despite 
wide differences in the historical and “emotional inheritances” 1 
surrounding the configuration of law, politics, and religion.  In Italy, the 
Lautsi v Italy2 case challenged the historical privilege of Catholicism in
Italy in the context of a modern, bureaucratized EU when the practice of 
hanging crucifixes in all public schools was put in question. Analogous 
questions concerning the presence of religious symbols in public schools 
have arisen in France, 3  Turkey, 4  and Germany. 5  The case of R(E) v 
Governing Body of JFS, 6  in the U.K., raised the limits of religious
community self-definition, asking whether a Jewish school had 
untrammelled authority to shape admissions policies that define who is 
and is not Jewish. Similar issues concerning the relationship between 
* Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.  Many thanks to John
Borrows, Lotem Perry-Hazzan, and Mariana Valverde for comments on earlier drafts of 
this article, and to Jenn Aubrey for conversations that have significantly influenced my 
thinking on many of these issues.  Thanks also to Geneviève Murray and Madison 
Robins for their excellent research assistance and to the two anonymous peer reviewers 
for their helpful comments. The author wishes to acknowledge the financial support for 
this research provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of 
Canada. 
1 This phrase, “emotional inheritances,” is borrowed from Talal Asad, "French Secularism 
and the 'Islamic Veil Affair'," The Hegehog Review (2006).
2 Lautsi and others v Italy, 19 March 2011, European Court of Human Rights (Grand
Chamber), No. 30814/06. 
3 Talal Asad provides a rich and provocative discussion of the Stasi Commission and its 
place in recent debates about French secularism and national identity: "French Secularism 
and the 'Islamic Veil Affair'." 
4 See Leila Şahin v Turkey, 10 November 2005, European Court of Human Rights (Grand
Chamber), No. 44774/98. 
5 Tobias Lock offers a helpful account of the recent history of religious symbols in 
German schools: Tobias Lock, "Of Crucifixes and Headscarves: Religious Symbols in 
German Schools," in Law, Relgious Freedoms, and Education in Europe, ed. Marie Hunter-
Henin (London: Ashgate, 2012). 
6 [2009] UKSC 15. 
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religious belonging and legal prohibitions on discrimination have arisen 
in Israel.7 
In Canada, the education sphere has become the focal point – often 
a flashpoint – for debates about both the accommodation of religious 
difference and the challenges of civic belonging in conditions of religious 
diversity. This close tethering of issues of religious difference and 
education, as well as the use of religion as a site of accommodation and as 
a tool for assimilation, have a deep and rich pedigree in Canada. The 
political compromises between English and French Canada at the 
founding of the nation placed religious accommodation through 
education at the cornerstone of the state. The Treaty of Paris (1763)8 and the 
Quebec Act (1774)9 offered a form of accommodation and toleration for 
Roman Catholicism to French inhabitants of what would eventually be 
Canada. These protections found their expression in the first Canadian 
constitution, the British North America Act (1867),10 in s. 93, a provision that 
guaranteed publicly funded Roman Catholic education outside of Quebec, 
and Protestant public education within majority-Catholic Quebec. Yet 
alongside this story of accommodation is also a history of the use of 
education to control and suppress cultural and religious difference. 
Residential schools were used by the state in a devastating assault on 
Aboriginal religion, language, and culture, employing state supported and 
religiously provided education in an attempt to violently assimilate the 
Indigenous peoples of Canada. The effects of this period, one of the 
darkest in Canadian history, are still felt today.11 And a journey into the 
religious history of British Columbia and Alberta offers up the case of the 
Doukhobors, whose religious beliefs led to violent clashes with the state 
over the education of children.12 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See, for example, Noar Kehalacha Association v Ministry of Education, (2009) IsrLR 84, HCJ 
1067/08; Tebeka Advocacy for Equality & Justice for Ethiopian-Israelis v The ministry of 
Education (2010), HCJ 7426/08. 
8 Definitive Treaty of Peace, France, Great Britain, and Spain, 10 February 1763, 42 Cons TS 
279. 
9 Quebec Act, 1774 (UK), 14 Geo III, c 83. 
10 Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5 
(formerly British North America Act, 1867). 
11 See J. R. Miller, Shingwauk's Vision: A History of Native Residential Schools  (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1996). For a recent statement from the Supreme Court of 
Canada on the effects of this experience, see R v Ipeelee, [2012] 1 SCR 433. 
12 John P.S. McLaren, "The Doukhobor Belief in Individual Faith and Conscience and the 
Demands of the Secular State," in Religious Conscience, the State, and the Law: Historical 
Contexts and Contemporary Significance, ed. John McLaren and Harold Coward (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1999), 199.  
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 Yet this story of education as the terrain on which issues of 
religious difference and civic belonging has been played is not simply an 
interesting, if harrowing, history. Education has continued to be the arena 
that has yielded some of the fiercest and most perplexing challenges in the 
governance and accommodation of religious difference. Indeed, as the 
forms and intensity of religious difference in Canada have multiplied, so 
too have the cases in which conflicts between religious accommodation 
and the demands of public life have taken shape around questions of 
education.13 Shortly after the introduction of the Charter14 in 1982, the 
Supreme Court of Canada was asked to reconsider the privileging of state-
funded Catholic education in Ontario – the fruit of that guarantee at 
Confederation found in s. 93 – in light of the existence of Jewish, 
Protestant, and other religious groups for whom faith- and culture-based 
education was equally important as a means of sustaining their 
communities. 15  Although the Supreme Court declined to disrupt the 
results of this historical compromise, the issue remains a live political 
question. The law of religious freedom led to the secularization of public 
education, with traditional Christian symbols and practices draining from 
public schools.16 Legal conflicts between the rights of sexual minorities 
and those of religious groups have arisen principally in the field of 
education, with the Court having to rule on the extent to which religious 
viewpoints can inform a public school board’s decision-making about 
representing same-sex parented families in Kindergarten-Grade 1 
curriculum,17 whether publicly funded Catholic schools can exclude a 
male student’s boyfriend from the prom, 18  and whether a private 
Evangelical Christian religious university that has a code of conduct that 
discriminates against gay, lesbian, and queer students and faculty can 
have their teachers’ training program publicly accredited.19 Through these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 For an account of some of the features that make religious accommodation and 
toleration particularly fraught and vexing in educational contexts, see Colin Macleod, 
"Toleration, Chidren and Education," Educational Philosophy and Theory 42, no. 1 (2010). 
14 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
15 See Reference re Bill 30, An Act to Amend the Education Act (Ontario), [1987] 1 SCR 1148; 
Adler v Ontario, [1996] 3 SCR 609. 
16 See Zylberberg v Sudbury Board of Education (1988), 65 OR (2d) 641 (CA).  
17 See Chamberlain v Surrey School District No. 36, [2002] 4 SCR 710. 
18 See Hall v Powers (2002), 213 DLR (4th) 308. 
19 See Trinity Western University v British Columbia College of Teachers, [2001] 1 SCR 772.  
See also Richard Moon, "Sexual Orientation, Equality, and Religious Freedom in the 
Public Schools: A Comment on Trinity Western University v. B.C. College of Teachers and 
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and many other cases, both the deeper and the modern histories of the 
legal management of religious diversity in Canada could be told quite 
ably through a story about education.  
 This article is an attempt to understand why education, and 
particularly public education, has been a crucible for the relationship 
between state and religious diversity. I will exploit a decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada to explore why this is so and how issues of 
religious diversity are handled through law. Although my focus is on the 
Canadian example, my suspicion is that at least some of the lessons are 
more generalizable. And ultimately, though I enter the problem through 
the portal of education, I arrive at a set of claims about the nature of – and 
a key distinction within – the idea of state neutrality. I begin, however, 
with one provocative account of what is at stake in education.  
 
Natality, Responsibility, and the Stakes of Education 
 
 In Between Past and Future, Hannah Arendt begins a chapter entitled 
“The Crisis in Education” by defending the idea that one could 
characterize a problem in American approaches to education as a “crisis” 
without engaging in rank hyperbole.20  Arendt concedes that, in view of 
the world-scale crises that afflicted humanity in the 20th century, 
complaints about modern approaches to education might seem of trifling 
import. Yet she insists on the importance of her topic and the aptness of 
her label. The chapter is a kind of account of the grand social and 
philosophical stakes of education.  
 The problem that Arendt identified in her time was the ascendancy 
of a view of child education that embraced a certain constructivist 
pedagogy, one that insisted that teachers ought not to instruct or teach the 
children about the world directly but, rather, that good education inhered 
in facilitating the child’s own discovery of the world. Teachers should step 
back, leave the world to the children to discover and construct 
autonomously. Arendt saw much politically and philosophically wrong 
with this approach. Indeed, she viewed it as a crisis of responsibility. 
Arendt argues that, through education, adults must take responsibility for 
the world as it is, must faithfully reflect, embody and hold it up to 
children, quite apart from their hopes about what that world might 
become: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Chamberlain v. Surrey School Board, District 36," Review of Constitutional Studies 8, no. 2 
(2003). 
20 Hannah Arendt, "The Crisis in Education," in Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in 
Political Thought (London: Penguin Books, [1968] 2006). 
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educators here stand in relation to the young as 
representatives of a world for which they must assume 
responsibility although they themselves did not make it, and 
even though they may, secretly or openly, wish it were other 
than it is. This responsibility is not arbitrarily imposed upon 
educators; it is implicit in the fact that the young are 
introduced by adults into a continuously changing world. 21 
 
Why, for Arendt, is there this responsibility? Can more be said beyond the 
banal observation that what we teach our children is important?  
 The essence of education, Arendt argues, is the fact of natality: “the 
fact that we have all come into the world by being born and that this 
world is constantly renewed through birth”.22  However revolutionary, 
however novel, however progressive the times into which a child is born, 
the world is old. It is “superannuated and close to destruction”.23 And this 
fact of natality is what gives education its special mandate, its political 
essence:  
 
Education is the point at which we decide whether we love 
the world enough to assume responsibility for it and by the 
same token save it from that ruin which, except for renewal, 
except for the coming of the new and young, would be 
inevitable. And education, too, is where we decide whether 
we love our children enough not to expel them from our 
world and leave them to their own devices, nor to strike 
from their hands the chance of undertaking something new, 
something unforeseen by us, but to prepare them in advance 
for the task of renewing a common world.24  
 
There is much in this rich quotation that gestures to what is at stake in 
approaches to, and debates about, education. 
 First, Arendt emphasizes here that education is about the 
sustenance and continuance of social worlds. Education is where culture 
happens, it is where the old, otherwise consigned to fade, is refreshed and 
restored by new hands. Community is confirmed, renewed, and sustained 
through the faithful representation of the world to the “new ones.” And so 
Arendt speaks of the way in which parents, through education, assume 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Ibid., at 186. 
22 Ibid., at 193. 
23 Ibid., at 189. 
24 Ibid., at 193. 
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responsibility “for the life and development of the child and for the 
continuance of the world”.25  Because we love our worlds, through education 
we entrust their continuance and vitality to a new generation.  
 But Arendt’s claim is ultimately one about political freedom, not 
just the transmission of culture and the continuance of social worlds. Were 
it only that, education could be solely a familial, private, or parochial 
matter. To be sure, Arendt sees the family as serving a potentially 
important role, one she links to the need that children have for privacy. 
She describes the family as the four walls that protect the child from the 
outside world: “These four walls, within which people’s private family life 
is lived, constitute a shield against the world and specifically against the 
public aspect of the world”.26  But the family is not the site of the 
responsibility that she has in mind. As much as the family can be a site of 
shelter, it can also be a place of unfreedom, repression, and – too often – 
denial of the dignity of a safe and full existence. As Arendt herself notes, 
the responsibility assumed by parents for the continuance of their world 
can work at cross-purposes with their responsibility for the life and 
development of the child. The four walls are as apt to constrain as to 
protect. And it is here that we see Arendt’s dominant theme emerge – 
education as a condition for freedom:  
 
Normally the child is first introduced to the world in school. 
Now school is by no means the world and must not pretend 
to be; it is rather the institution that we interpose between 
the private domain of home and the world in order to make 
the transition from the family to the world possible at all. 
Attendance there is required not by the family but by the 
state, that is by the public world, and so, in relation to the 
child, school in a sense represents the world, although it is 
not yet actually the world.  27 
 
Education is the bridge between family or community and “the world.” It 
seeks to equip children with a picture of the world as they will find it. In 
so doing, education opens up new alternatives in their horizons of 
possibility for their lives, for ethical engagement with others, and for 
forms of a common world. Education gives children “the chance of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Ibid., at 182. 
26 Ibid., at 183. 
27 Ibid., at 185. 
Accepted Version Forthcoming in the Canadian Journal of Law and Society
7	  
undertaking something new, something unforeseen by us”.28  Because we 
love our children, through education we equip them for freedom.   
 Education is about making and sustaining community; about 
shaping a creative, ethical actor in the world; it is perhaps one of the key 
pivot points between family and society; it is a site for preparation for the 
world as we now find it; and, in complex ways, it is a place for the 
cultivation and exercise of freedom.  
 This is what sits at the heart of conflicts and debates about religious 
diversity, the state, and education. These contests that take place within 
school settings are conversations about the world for which we are 
prepared to take responsibility. For religious groups and the state alike, 
education is the means by which culture, tradition, value and community 
are affirmed and sustained. Education is a political act concerned with 
inducing a child into a social world; in this, it is unapologetically 
conservative. This is, indeed, the appeal and importance of education to 
the state and to sub-national (including religious) communities alike. It is 
this reality that led to the provision for religious schools as the key 
protection for French culture at the founding of Canada. This is one facet 
of education – the transmission of social worlds. Yet, as Arendt stresses, 
education is also about providing the conditions for the ethical exercise of 
freedom, with the possibilities and uncertainties – the potential for the 
truly new – that this entails. This is the complex frame in which cases 
about religion and education must be read.  
 
SL v Commission scolaire des Chênes 
 
 It is with these ideas in mind that I now examine a recent case 
decided by the Supreme Court of Canada, SL v Commission scolaire des 
Chênes.29 The case raised the question of whether parents may exempt 
their children from classes designed to expose them to a variety of 
religious traditions and to the history of religion in Quebec.  The decision 
discloses much about recent shifts in the terrain of religion and secularism 
in Canada, and does so in a context that interestingly activates the 
concerns and stakes that I have thus far explored.  
 To appreciate the case fully, the SL decision must be placed on two 
interesting trajectories in the interaction of law and religion in Canada. 
The first is a shift in the types of concerns reflected in law and religion 
cases. One might say that early in the jurisprudence under the Charter, the 
dominant theme in the religious freedom cases at the Supreme Court of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Ibid., at 193. See Mordechai Gordon, "Hannah Arendt on Authority: Conservatism in 
Education Reconsidered," Educational Theory 49, no. 2 (1999): 172. 
29 [2012] 1 SCR 235. 
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Canada was the disembedding of Christian privilege. The first freedom of 
religion case heard by the Supreme Court under the Charter, and the case 
that set the path for the development of the jurisprudence in this area, was 
R v Big M Drug Mart.30 The case turned on whether common Sunday day 
of rest imposed under legislation entitled The Lord’s Day Act was 
consistent with principles of religious liberty. In finding that the 
legislation was irredeemably tainted by its facial endorsement of religion, 
contrary to the right to be free from state-imposed religion, Justice Dickson 
(as he then was) explained the mischief of the legislation as follows:  
 
To the extent that it binds all to a sectarian Christian ideal, 
the Lord’s Day Act works a form of coercion inimical to the 
spirit of the Charter and the dignity of all non-
Christians….The theological content of the legislation 
remains as a subtle and constant reminder to religious 
minorities within the country of their differences with, and 
alienation from, the dominant religious culture.31 
 
Thus, the early tone of the jurisprudence under the Charter was one that 
sounded in the register of the pluralistic demands of a secular society. 
This and other early decisions were frequently about unseating 
Christianity’s privileged place next to state institutions and in political life. 
This tone was also present in the field of education, with early cases 
famously concerning themselves with stripping away the artefacts of 
Christian historical privilege in public schools. In Zylberberg v Sudbury 
Board of Education,32 the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled unconstitutional a 
local regulation that required that public school days begin or end with 
the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer, a practice that had subsisted in many 
Canadian public schools since early in the life of the country. Drawing 
inspiration from Justice Dickson’s reasons in Big M, the Ontario Court of 
Appeal held that this practice served to inculcate Christianity among 
public school pupils and was inconsistent with the multicultural reality of 
modern Canada. Provisions allowing for children to be exempted from the 
practice could not cure the problem. This 1988 decision sits interestingly 
alongside similar issues that have emerged more recently in Turkey, 
France, Germany, and elsewhere in Europe. 
 The examples could be multiplied. The key point is that in many of 
the early cases, freedom of religion was really about evenhandedness as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 R v Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 SCR 295. 
31 Ibid., at 337. 
32 Supra note 16. 
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amongst religious and non-religious creeds, freedom from state-enforced 
religious practices or norms, and, in particular, disrupting the structural 
hegemony of Christianity. Over the next 20 years, the varieties of cases on 
religion pluralized, but the jurisprudence on freedom of religion remained 
comparatively underdeveloped within the package of Charter rights. The 
interesting inversion reflected in the SL decision came during a 
renaissance in the law of religious freedom in the last 10 years. On one 
interpretation of the recent cases, issues of religious freedom have ceased 
being dominantly about freedom from religion,33 and have become about 
religious groups seeking exemptions from, or to push back on, a secular or 
non-religious default environment. Many of these cases have been about 
the appearance of religious symbols in public spaces.34 Such cases have 
also penetrated the education setting, with an important decision in recent 
Canadian jurisprudence on religious accommodation concerning the 
ability of a Sikh youngster to wear a kirpan, or religious dagger, in public 
school.35 Most relevant to this article is a meaningful subset of these cases 
in which religious schools or religious individuals involved in public 
schools have sought to resist substantive curricular or normative 
principles using arguments based in religious freedom. 
 One such case is Hall v Powers,36 in which a Roman Catholic school 
refused to allow a gay student to bring his boyfriend to the high school 
prom. The student sought an interim injunction forcing the school to allow 
him and his boyfriend to attend.  Despite the fact that this was a Roman 
Catholic school, the Court was sympathetic and issued the injunction. In 
the same year, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the case of 
Chamberlain v Surrey School District No. 36.37 Although not squarely a 
Charter case, Chamberlain was an important point in the recent Canadian 
jurisprudence on religion and secularism. The case involved a local public 
school board that, on the basis of the religious views of the parents in the 
constituency, had prohibited the use of resources depicting same-sex 
parented families in Kindergarten/Grade 1 classes. The Supreme Court 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 With its unique history of state-church relations, reflected in the historical sketch 
provided earlier in this article, Canada has never adopted the strict institutional 
separationism found in U.S. constitutional law, nor has it endorsed the laïc approach 
found in France.  Nevertheless, early in the Charter jurisprudence, Canadian courts 
recognized that freedom of religion implies freedom from religion, in the sense of freedom 
from coercion or compulsion in matters of religion.   
34 See, e.g., Rosenberg v Outremont (City), [2001] RJQ 1556 (SC), concerning the eruv, or 
Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem [2004] 2 SCR 551, concerning the sukkah on a balcony. 
35 See Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 SCR 256. 
36 Supra note 18. 
37 Supra note 17. 
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referred to the secular nature of public schools, as explicitly mandated by 
the governing legislation, and held that the decision of the school board 
was unreasonable because it had failed to give weight to secular principles 
of anti-discrimination, equality, and diversity. One further example, 
though one in which the religious community was successful in pushing 
back on secular norms, is Trinity Western University v British Columbia 
College of Teachers.38 The case involved a college of teachers that had 
denied public accreditation to the teacher’s program of an Evangelical 
Christian university on the grounds that the University required 
agreement to a code of conduct that discriminated against homosexual 
students and faculty. Trinity Western University successfully challenged 
the College’s decision. The Supreme Court of Canada ruled that it was 
improper for the College to predict the future conduct of teachers trained 
at TWU on the basis of the code of conduct that they had signed.  
 Recent cases invert the early problematic. Less concerned with 
using the law to cleanse schools of religious traces, litigants are now 
deploying the logic of freedom of religion to resist a felt hegemony of 
secular ideals. Freedom from religion undergoes a subtle shift to freedom 
from the secular. SL sits at the high-water mark of this fascinating 
inversion, the first frame of context for the case. 
 The second arc of historical development in which the SL decision 
participates – again, at a kind of zenith of the trend – is more particular to 
the distinctive religious and social history of Quebec. In the latter half of 
the 20th century, Canada experienced a profound diversification of 
cultures within its populace. This increased pluralism eventually led to a 
Canadian approach of multiculturalism, and, in 1971, the adoption of 
multiculturalism as official state policy.  The period also saw an increasing 
endorsement of human rights instruments, culminating in the 
entrenchment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. While these 
trends were affecting all of Canada, Quebec was undergoing another 
profound change. Of course, in the origins of the country, Quebec’s 
autonomy and identity were closely tied to Catholicism and the church. 
Over the 1960s, a set of rapid and intense social changes in Quebec – the 
so-called “Quiet Revolution” – transformed the society. Although there 
were other social and political changes associated with the quiet 
revolution, of most relevance to this article was the radical erosion of the 
power of the Roman Catholic Church in Quebec and the dramatic 
decoupling of secular politics and religious authority. Just as it had been 
crucial to the constitutional history of Catholicism in Canada, education 
was also central to the shifts of the Quiet Revolution. In 1964 the Quebec 
government took control over public education, something that had been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 [2001] 1 SCR 772. 
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largely carried out by Catholic organizations before that time. This began 
a process that would culminate, three decades later, in the end of 
denominational school boards in Quebec and the removal of Quebec from 
the education provisions of s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.  
 The SL case was a response to the most recent move in this 50-year 
process of the disentanglement of religion and education in Quebec. In 
2005 the Quebec government elected to replace all remaining Catholic and 
Protestant programs of religious instruction with a compulsory common 
education program for all public schools, entitled the “Ethics and 
Religious Culture Course” (ERC). Schools were no longer denominational 
by this time, but students frequently received some form of religious 
instruction within their public educations. The ERC would end such 
instruction, replacing it with a program that would teach about varieties 
of ethical and cultural frameworks within Quebec and would instruct 
about a range of religious traditions, as well as on the history of religion in 
Quebec. The preamble to the program, as it relates to religion, states as 
follows: 
 
Instruction in religious culture, for its part, is aimed at 
fostering an understanding of several religious traditions 
whose influence has been felt and is still felt in our society 
today. In this regard, emphasis will be placed on Québec’s 
religious heritage. The historical and cultural importance of 
Catholicism and Protestantism will be given particular 
prominence. The goal is neither to accompany students in a 
spiritual quest, nor to present the history of doctrines and 
religions, nor to promote some new common religious 
doctrine aimed at replacing specific beliefs.39  
 
The purpose of the course was to prepare children for life in a pluralistic 
society, to educate them in the range of religious traditions that they 
might encounter, and to teach them about the religious heritage of Quebec. 
In 1997, when the first steps towards this new curriculum were being 
taken, the Quebec Minister of Education justified this move in the 
following way: 
 
The social and religious landscape is shifting in all regions of 
Quebec. Public schools must respect the free choice or the 
free refusal of religion. … All schools must teach students to 
respect different allegiances. However, our schools must not 
altogether dismiss religious education. They must show that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 SL, at para 34. 
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they are open and able to recognize, regardless of specific 
convictions and from a critical point of view, the 
contribution made by the different religions in terms of 
culture, values and humanism…. 
 
…in the context of a pluralistic society, is it not desirable that 
all students receive some instruction concerning the 
phenomenon of religion, courses on religious culture which 
cover the various great traditions, and courses on the history 
of religion?40 
 
In 2008, the ERC became mandatory for all students in Quebec. 
 In May of that year, S.L. and D.J., Roman Catholic parents of two 
school-aged children in Quebec requested an exemption from the ERC for 
their children on the basis that this program infringed their and their 
children’s freedom of conscience and religion. The heart of their position 
was that the ERC interfered with their ability to pass on Roman 
Catholicism to their children because it purported to teach about 
Catholicism in a neutral way alongside a number of other religions. Such 
an approach would inculcate a kind of relativism, the parents claimed, 
whereas they sought to instill in their children a commitment to the truth 
of the Catholic creed. The ministry refused their request in two separate 
decisions, decisions that were confirmed by the Superior Court and the 
Court of Appeal. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the central 
question was whether mandatory exposure to the ERC in public schools 
offended religious freedom.41  
 The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The crux of its decision 
was that the applicant parents had failed to discharge their burden of 
showing precisely how the ERC would interfere with their sincerely held 
commitment (and their right) to pass on their religion to their children. It 
is important to observe – and the majority and separate concurring 
decisions at the Supreme Court of Canada emphasize – that, having 
initiated the case so shortly after the ERC came into effect, there was no 
evidence as to how the course was actually delivered in public schools. 
Both the majority and minority decisions suggest that if it turned out that 
the ERC were implemented in a way that was disparaging or dismissive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Ibid., at paras 13 and 14. 
41 The case of Québec (Procureur general) c Loyola High School, 2012 QCCA 2139, raises an 
associated and potentially even more fraught issue – whether private religious schools 
must teach the ERC as prescribed by the ministry, or whether they can deliver a faith-
inflected version of the course. At the time of writing, application for leave to appeal to 
the Supreme Court of Canada had been submitted.  
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of religion, the issue might well look different. But, so long as such 
instruction does not denigrate or promote one or another conception of 
religion, the mere fact of instructing children on various religious, ethical, 
and cultural systems, as well as on religious history in Quebec, did not 
interfere with the parents’ religious freedom. For the Court, the magic lies 
in the concept of “indoctrination”, which is the legal limit on the state’s 
capacity to instruct on religion. The Court rejects the proposition that 
“exposing children to ‘a comprehensive presentation of various religions 
without forcing the children to join them’ constitutes in itself an 
indoctrination of students that would infringe the appellants’ freedom of 
religion”. 42   Parents could continue to instruct their children on 
Catholicism as they saw fit at home. 
 The parents further argued that instruction on a variety of religious 
traditions without any clear position being transmitted – and, presumably, 
in dissonance with what is being taught at home – produces confusion in 
the child. The Court’s reasoning in rejecting this argument is revealing in 
light of the themes of this article. Justice Deschamps writes as follows: 
 
Parents are free to pass their personal beliefs on to their 
children if they so wish. However, the early exposure of 
children to realities that differ from those in their immediate 
family environment is a fact of life in society. The suggestion 
that exposing children to a variety of religious facts in itself 
infringes their religious freedom or that of their parents 
amounts to a rejection of the multicultural reality of 
Canadian society and ignores the Quebec government’s 
obligations with regard to public education. Although such 
exposure can be a source of friction, it does not in itself 
constitute an infringement of s. 2(a) of the Canadian Charter 
and of s. 3 of the Quebec Charter.43  
 
The Court expresses confidence in children’s capacity to hold together 
multiple messages in the mix of education that they receive from their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 SL, at para 37.  The SL cases mirrors many of the issues in the U.S. case of Mozert v 
Hawkins County Bd of Education, 827 F2d 1058 (6th Cir 1987) and the Court’s conclusion 
parallel the result in Mozert.  Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 205 (1971), is, of course, another 
famous US case on religious objections to education, though it raises somewhat different 
issues.  The Supreme Court of the United States ruled in favor of the Amish parents who 
objected to education beyond the 8th grade.  For a defence of the “Liberal Civic Education” 
based in a reaction to Mozert and Rawlsian political liberalism, see Stephen Macedo, 
"Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John 
Rawls?," Ethics 105, no. 3 (1995).   
43 SL, at para 40. 
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parents and from the school. But Justice Deschamps goes further. She 
suggests that the state might have a duty to expose children to a variety of 
religious and cultural “facts” around them, reasoning that the 
“multicultural reality of Canada” imposes certain obligations on the state 
regarding education. So long as the message remains “neutral” (a matter 
to which I will return below), to deny the Quebec government the ability 
to teach such a course to all children would be to disregard this obligation.  
 The decision is not terribly consequential as a matter of legal 
doctrine, turning as it did on an evidentiary point: given the early stage of 
the implementation of the ERC, the applicants were not able to adduce 
evidence that the course was being taught in a way that interfered with 
their ability to educate their children consistent with Roman Catholicism. 
Should such evidence emerge, the case might resolve differently. A 
general education in a range of religious traditions and in the social and 
political history of religion did not, in itself, amount to secular 
indoctrination, as the parents suggested. The case nevertheless offers 
much for understanding why the field of education is such a persistent 
flashpoint around the world for issues of religion and secularism.  
The Court’s use of the concept of indoctrination is where I want to 
join this decision with the broader ideas and themes evoked in the 
discussion of Arendt’s views on education. Specifically, I want to question 
and qualify the Court’s claim that this course is not a form of 
indoctrination. All education is, in a sense, a project of indoctrination. 
Education is a means of inducing a child into a world. It is about culture 
and, to exploit the etymology of the term, the cultivation of a certain kind 
of subject. Education is an opportunity for the transmission of tradition 
and history, and for the necessary preparation of children for the task of 
renewing and sustaining community. This was Arendt’s first insight.44  It 
goes some distance in helping to appreciate the stakes of such disputes, 
and to understand the passion and persistence of questions of education 
in the meeting of religion and state authority. 
The history of confederation, the experience of Aboriginal peoples, 
and the activism of Jewish and other religious communities around issues 
of education in Canada all point to the depth of communities’ interest in 
education. In Adler,45 a case in which non-Catholic parents argued that the 
funding of Catholic and public schools in accordance with s. 93 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867, but not other religious schools, breached their 
equality and religious freedom rights, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé supported 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 See also Michael W. Apple, Ideology and Curriculum, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 
1990); Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational 
Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life  (New York: Basic Books, 1976). 
45 Adler, supra note 15. 
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her position that the state should be required to provide funding to these 
groups in the following terms: 
 
At issue here are the efforts of small, insular religious 
minority communities seeking to survive in a large, secular 
society…. we cannot imagine a deeper scar being inflicted on 
a more insular group by the denial of a more fundamental 
interest; it is the very survival of these communities which is 
threatened.46  
 
It is for this reason that governments have continued to learn, as the 
example of the Doukhobors taught in Canada, that cultural communities 
will struggle – politically and, if necessary, physically – over issues of 
education.  What is at stake in education is the future and vitality of the 
group itself, the continuation of a social world.  
 The more difficult question from a liberal political position is 
whether the state has a legitimate claim to the formation of its citizens. 
May it use education as a means of shaping children, of inducing them 
into the world as we have it? Viewed from some perspectives, this kind of 
self-conscious citizen formation on the part of the state may seem to have 
a certain illiberal quality to it; to be sure, allowing the state to occupy all 
corners of the landscape of education – public and private – and to crowd 
out community, family, and religious interests in the formation of the 
child would be both unwise and repressive. Yet with deep pluralism and 
secularism (understood in some fashion)47 as important political facts 
about our world, a central role for the state in citizen formation seems an 
irreducible public function. A pluralist democracy depends on the 
capacity of citizens to engage in thoughtful and inclusive forms of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Ibid., at para 86. 
47 Recent literature has emphasized the broad range of configurations of religion, politics, 
and law that can subsist under the label “secular.”  Some are moved to insist on the 
pluralisation of the term, referring instead to “secularisms;” others claim that there is 
nevertheless something that links these various manifestations of the secular together.  
This piece does not directly join this debate about the meaning of the term “secular,” 
though debates about religion education and the nature of claims for state neutrality are 
part of wrestling with the concept and implications of secularism.  For thoughtful 
discussions of the idea of “secularism,” see e.g. Asad, "French Secularism and the 'Islamic 
Veil Affair'."; Mayanthi L. Fernando, "Reconfiguring Freedom: Muslim Piety and the 
Limits of Secular Law and Public Discourse in France," American Ethnologist 37, no. 1 
(2010); James Q. Whitman, "Separating Church and State: The Atlantic Divide," Historical 
Reflections 34, no. 3 (2008); Janet R. Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini, eds., Secularisms 
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2008); Michael Warner, Jonathan 
VanAntwerpen, and Crag Calhoun, eds., Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age 
(Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
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deliberation amidst – and enriched by – substantial divergence in 
lifestyles and worldviews. As Taylor and Maclure emphasize, “[p]eaceful 
coexistence in a diverse society requires that we learn to find normal a 
range of identity-related differences.”48  Intercultural knowledge, habits of 
tolerance, and respectful interaction across difference now appear to be 
civic skills comparable in importance to basic knowledge in math and 
science.49 In equipping children with these skills through primary and 
secondary education, the state is preparing them to discharge the burdens 
of responsible participation in a pluralist democracy, one in which they 
will have the opportunity to interact, collaborate, and constructively 
disagree with those who hold beliefs and live modes of life that differ 
from and challenge their own.  Moreover, education about difference 
serves the principle of respect for autonomy, a commitment that 
underwrites fundamental rights and freedoms and on which the 
functioning of our democratic institutions depends.  Such exposure to 
diversity is an expression of regard for, and an aspect of the cultivation of, 
the developing autonomy of children.  As Colin Macleod explains, 
“development of the contemplative aspect of autonomy involves ensuring 
that children learn about, understand, and even have a kind of 
appreciation of the plurality of ends and perspectives that are present in a 
diverse society.”50  
This kind of education may well “make the task more difficult for 
parents seeking to transmit a particular order of beliefs to their children 
and even more difficult for groups wishing to shield themselves from the 
influence of the larger society;”51 it is nevertheless essential to cultivating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience  (Cambridge, 
Mass; London: Harvard University Press, 2011) 47. 
49 In Israel, society is facing a social crisis brought about by the failure to properly balance 
the needs of public education and claims of religious freedom.  Substantial portions of 
the male ultra-Orthodox community are not being equipped with basic knowledge in 
fields such as English and math, creating tremendous barriers to employment and post-
secondary education in this rapidly growing demographic. See Yoel Finkelman, "Ultra-
Orthodox/Haredi Education," in International Handbook of Jewish Education, ed. Helena 
Miller, Lisa Grant, and Alex Pomson, International Handbooks of Religion and Education 
(Springer Netherlands, 2011); Eli Berman, "Sect, Subsidy, and Sacrifice: An Economist's 
View of Ultra-Orthodox Jews," The Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, no. 3 (2000); 
Maayan Lubell, "Israeli Education: A State Divided," Chicago Tribune, 2012 Jan 01 2012; 
Amnon Rubinstein, "Give Haredi Children Tools for Life," Jerusalem Post, 2007 Sep 05 
2007. For a case addressing the challenge of imposing a “core curriculum” on ultra-
Orthodox schools, see The Center for Jewish Pluralism v The Ministry of Eduction (2008), HCJ 
4805/07. 
50 Macleod, "Toleration, Chidren and Education," 17. 
51 Maclure and Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience: 16.  See also Macleod, 
"Toleration, Chidren and Education," 13. 
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the child’s own capacity for critical and sensitive engagement with local, 
national, and global issues. 52   Indeed, in its majority decision in 
Chamberlain v Surrey School District No. 36, 53  the Court affirmed the 
legitimacy of such a role for public education.  While recognizing the 
strong interest that parents have in their children’s education, and the 
importance of parental involvement, Chief Justice McLachlin emphasized 
that “[p]arental views, however important, cannot override the imperative 
placed upon the British Columbia public schools to mirror the diversity of 
the community and teach tolerance and understanding of difference”.54  
“Schools,” the Court held in TWU, “are meant to develop civic virtue and 
responsible citizenship”.55  Recall Arendt’s claim that school serves the 
important role of introducing the child to the world, that it “represents the 
world,” and that it is “the institution that we interpose between the 
private domain of home and the world in order to make the transition 
from the family to the world possible at all.”56  When that world is, 
factually, one of competing claims of truth, of religious diversity, of sexual 
diversity, of rich cultural difference, there is a strong case to be made that 
the state has a responsibility to equip the child for this transition between 
community or family and the broader world, for the sake of that common 
world that they are all tasked with renewing.57 In the words of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, education should be directed to “the 
preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society”.58  
 One might object that to call this kind of state undertaking 
“indoctrination” is to misuse the label: a key feature of indoctrination, 
properly identified, is that its goal is to contain and limit options and 
alternatives contemplated by the subject. State education in Canada, as I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 See Maclure and Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience: 102-3.  
53 [2002] 4 SCR 710. 
54 Chamberlain, at para 33. 
55 TWU, at para 13. 
56 Arendt, supra note 20 at 185; see above at note 27. 
57 The issue of who is best equipped to actually teach the content in something like a 
religious cultures course – a point not addressed in SL – is a separate, but important, 
point.  It may well be that the wisest course of action, in terms of both expertise and buy-
in, would be to involve the community in delivering this aspect of a curriculum.  The 
Loyola case, supra note 41, poses the related question of whether there can be variation 
amongst religious and public schools in how the ERC could be delivered.  Although that 
issue would demand its own careful analysis, I would be skeptical of a position that 
would imply that there is only one way to effectively teach intercultural knowledge and 
respectful engagement across difference.   
58 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3, Can TS 1992 No 3, 
Article 29, section 1(d).   
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have described it, is not engaged in that kind of horizon-limiting project. 
This refinement is welcome because it specifies a condition of any claim 
that the state has to citizen formation. Such a claim by the state is justified 
owing to education’s function in opening up horizons of possibility for the 
child, nourishing that individual’s capacity for critical reflection, and 
serving as an open, traversable portal between world and family. The 
political activity of education is justifiable to the extent that it plays the 
role that Arendt imagines (her second, crucial, point) – that it conduces to 
the child’s freedom. Important limitations and caveats on the state’s use of 
education in citizen formation flow from that principle. First, such 
education must proceed with respect and appreciation for the traditions, 
ways, and beliefs found at home or in communities. Family and religious 
community can be rich sources of nourishment and meaning; they are 
often – though not always – the raw material for children’s self-definition 
and the exercise of their autonomy.59 Nothing about enlarging awareness 
of difference, cultivating skills of responsible citizenship, and facilitating a 
child’s free authorship of their lives commands or justifies estrangement 
from these substantial resources. Secondly, to endorse one religion or to 
disparage a non-harmful religious practice or tradition is inconsistent with 
these objectives.60  The purpose of such education is not to take positions 
on or to impose a “particular conception of the good life”.61  Insistence on 
this posture – let us call it a posture of neutrality – is crucial, as is 
recognition of the legitimate claim that states share with parents and 
communities over the formation of the child. 
 Some will immediately object that the priority given to freedom, 
self-authorship, and respect for difference, as well as the challenges that 
such education may pose for some parents and communities, is 
inconsistent with any such claim of neutrality.  With this, consideration of 
SL and the stakes of education brings us to a significant conceptual point 
about what it is that we ask of the state in the management of religious 
diversity, the point on which I wish to conclude this article. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 See Macleod, "Toleration, Chidren and Education," 16. 
60 Reference to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 58, is instructive 
here.  Article 29 states that education is to be directed to the child’s self-fulfillment; 
respect for human rights, tolerance, equality, and the environment; and generally to 
“preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society” (section 1(a, b, d, e)).  Yet 
section 1(c) also affirms a commitment to “the development of respect for the child’s 
parents, his or her own cultural identity, language and values” alongside “the national 
values of the country in which the child is living, the country from which he or she may 
originate, and for civilizations different from his or her own”. 
61 Maclure and Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience: 103. 
Accepted Version Forthcoming in the Canadian Journal of Law and Society
19	  
The Idea of State Neutrality 
 
 A notable feature of the Supreme Court’s decision in SL is the 
centrality of “state neutrality” as the governing principle for analyzing 
problems of religious diversity. Both the majority decision and the 
separate concurring decision, written by Justice LeBel, cite neutrality as 
the conceptual touchstone for the modern secular state. Justice Deschamps, 
for the majority, explains that “[t]he concept of state religious neutrality in 
Canadian case law has developed alongside a growing sensitivity to the 
multicultural makeup of Canada and the protection of minorities”62 and 
Justice LeBel specifically notes that the Supreme Court has consistently 
“stressed the importance of neutrality in the public school system”.63  
Apart from the evidentiary ruling that leads the Court to dismiss the claim, 
the preoccupation of the Court in SL is to affirm a commitment to a legal 
standard of state neutrality in response to the parents’ contention that the 
ERC was not a neutral curricular offering. At one fascinating point in the 
judgment, Justice Deschamps grants that perfect state neutrality might not 
be possible from a philosophical standpoint. In so doing, she opens space 
for what I think must be conceded – that a course on various religious 
cultures, such as the ERC, may not be received by religious parents or 
communities as an entirely neutral phenomenon.64 But with a quick “be 
that as it may,” the Court backs away from this finer philosophical point, 
taking comfort in the notion of state neutrality as a workable legal 
construct and rehearsing the legal genealogy of state neutrality in Canada. 
In effect, the Court’s response is to affirm that the case is about state 
neutrality, to endorse that concept and its centrality, but to simply deny 
that a breach of this controlling principle has occurred. 
 The place given by the Supreme Court of Canada in SL to state 
neutrality as the organizing principle in matters of religious diversity 
reflects something interesting about the history of ideas regarding the 
intersection of religion and the state. Toleration, so crucial to early 
political thought about religious difference, retains an important role in 
contemporary political and legal discussion about religion, signaling a 
need for an ethic of respect and practices of accommodation in matters of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 SL, at para 21. 
63 Ibid., at para 54. 
64 Ibid., at para 31.  Arif A. Jamal and Farid Panjwani interestingly argue that a kind of 
objectification of religion – including the sort of propensity to relativism about which the 
parents in the SL case complained – is intrinsic to the curricularization of religion. 
"Having Faith in Our Schools: Struggling with Definitions of Religion," in Law, Relgious 
Freedoms, and Education in Europe, ed. Marie Hunter-Henin (London: Ashgate, 2012), 79. 
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religious difference.65  Nevertheless, one can discern a shift in emphasis 
from language of “toleration” to that of “neutrality.” Judged on the basis 
of recent court rulings from a variety of courts around the world, one 
might well conclude that the concept of state neutrality has succeeded 
toleration as the guiding virtue in the legal treatment of religious 
difference.66 As the Supreme Court of Canada itself notes, “religious 
neutrality is now seen by many Western states as a [the?] legitimate means 
of creating a free space in which citizens of various beliefs can exercise 
their individual rights”.67   
 The concepts of toleration and neutrality are frequently invoked 
together, but, in fact, they paint quite different pictures of the dynamics 
involved in law’s response to religious difference. While calling for a 
certain ethic of respect and commitment to pluralism, toleration 
nevertheless conserves and confirms relations of power in its structural 
assumption of a “tolerator” and a “tolerated”.68 A tolerating “us” and a 
tolerated “them” is implicit in the idea of toleration as a response to 
difference.  Legal toleration closely aligns that “us” with the authority and 
power of the state.  Furthermore, the invocation of toleration also always 
conjures up its limits.  Toleration is a kind of ad hoc response to difference 
– I might be moved or required to tolerate this point of disagreement or 
difference but find the next intolerable.  The limits of legal toleration tend 
to faithfully trace the cultural assumptions that ground liberal 
constitutional culture.69  Finally, and most notable in its contrast with 
neutrality, toleration concedes – indeed, it proceeds from – the existence of 
a normative position on the side of the tolerator.  Otherwise put, when 
applied in response to religious difference, legal toleration admits that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 For Canadian examples, see e.g. Chamberlain v Surrey School District No 36, [2002] 4 SCR 
710 at para 21; Multani, supra note 35 at para 76. 
66 Writing in 2005, Bruce Ryder notes that the concept of neutrality has historically played 
a less important role in Canada than is has in the U.S.: "State Neutrality and Freedom of 
Conscience and Religion," Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 29(2005): 170-71. Although the 
concept retains different connotations in the two constitutional histories, “neutrality” 
plays a much more prominent role in the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent religion 
jurisprudence.  Research conducted by the author and Geneviève Murray (JD, 
NYU/Osgoode) reveals that, since 2004, the Court’s invocation of the concept of 
“toleration” has dropped off notably, with a suggestive increase in references to 
“neutrality,” spiking in 2012 with the SL decision.  
67 SL, at para 10. 
68 Wendy Brown, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire  (Princeton 
and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
69 Benjamin L. Berger, "The Cultural Limits of Legal Tolerance," Can. J. L. & Jur. 21, no. 2 
(2008). 
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legal system embodies and expresses a set of commitments and judgments 
about a good life – concedes its non-neutrality – but counsels acceptance of 
certain departures from the norm in the name of political peace, mutual 
respect, or other strategic or moral ends.   
Viewed in that light, it ought not to be surprising that neutrality 
has become so attractive in modern legal secularism. In a society of 
comparative religious homogeneity and unabashed confessional partiality 
– the kind of conditions out of which the concept emerged70 – toleration 
may have been a relatively satisfying response. In a modern context of 
deep normative pluralism, however, the politics and partiality implicit in 
toleration can prove troublesome. Neutrality seems to offer more.  A 
principle of state neutrality speaks to the evenhandedness necessary in a 
religiously and culturally plural society.  Furthermore, in Canada as 
elsewhere, the concept of state neutrality appealingly maps political 
instincts that focus on equality as the nonpareil political virtue (although 
there is a risk that embracing an unsophisticated conception of neutrality 
can unseat the idea that substantive equality sometimes demands 
practices of differential treatment and recognition). But most importantly, 
use of the concept of state neutrality better effaces the power dynamics 
involved in the management of religious diversity.  It rhetorically 
positions law outside of the “us” and “them” of political conflict; it casts 
law in the role of disinterested conciliator rather than boundary-setter; 
and its invocation relieves the legal system of the burden of its own 
cultural and historical contingency.  With this, language of neutrality 
appeals to a powerful myth that underwrites contemporary law. The 
conceit of autonomy upon which modern liberal legal orders lean for their 
political authority works by depoliticizing law’s rule sufficiently to attract 
broad assent. 71   Comaroff and Comaroff perceptively describe the 
seductiveness of law’s neutrality amidst the complexities of modern 
political life: 
 
the language of legality offers an ostensibly – note, ostensibly 
– neutral register for communication across lines of social 
and cultural cleavage, making it possible to equate unlike 
values, to authorize hybrid collaborations, and to adjudicate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 See Perez Zagorin, How the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West  (Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003). 
71 Courtney Bender and Pamela E. Klassen, eds., After Pluralism: Reimagining Religious 
Engagement (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); Brown, Regulating Aversion: 
Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire.  This was, of course, precisely Rawls’ ambition 
in his work on public reason and political liberalism: John Rawls, Political Liberalism  
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). 
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impossibly contradictory claims.  The pragmatic promise of 
jural instruments is that they have the capacity to create 
equivalence amidst contrast, providing a currency that 
appears to allow for the transaction of incommensurable 
interests across otherwise intransitive borders.  Thus it is 
that law offers a common denominator, and a means of 
imposing coherence, in socially and ethically incoherent 
circumstances.72 
 
The same process of depoliticization and ambition for coherence helps to 
explain the attractiveness of an organizing principle of state neutrality 
when specific attention is turned to problems of religious diversity.  
Consider, for example, the following passage from Justice Deschamps’ 
dissenting opinion in Bruker v Marcovitz, a passage in which the very 
essence of Canada’s commitment to religious freedom and 
multiculturalism turns out to be a guarantee of neutrality, a guarantee that 
underwrites the legitimacy of law under conditions of religious diversity: 
  
Canada's adoption of multiculturalism and attachment to 
the fundamental values of freedom of conscience and 
religion and of the right to equality guarantee to all 
Canadians that the courts will remain neutral where 
religious precepts are concerned. This neutrality gives the 
courts the legitimacy they need to play their role as arbiters 
in relation to the cohabitation of different religions and 
enables them to decide how to reconcile conflicting rights.73 
 
This is a fine expression of the typical imaginative tethering of law’s 
legitimacy to the depoliticizing effects of the concept of neutrality.  
Neutrality is a more comforting, less politicized standard under which to 
march in a landscape of considerable normative difference.   
 Whatever the reason for the concept’s ascendance, its current 
appeal and influence seems uncontroversial. And, to be sure, substantial 
political goods can be achieved guided by a commitment to state 
neutrality and evenhandedness in the treatment of religion. A demand for 
neutrality imposes a welcome discipline on government to carefully 
consider the ways in which its actions may unjustifiably favor one religion 
or impose burdens on another.  It also counsels caution about installing 
any particular metaphysical views – including agnosticism or atheism – as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, Theory from the South: Or, How Euro-America Is 
Evolving toward Africa  (Boulder and London: Paradigm Publishers, 2012) 145. 
73 Bruker v Marcovitz, [2007] 3 SCR 607, at para 102. 
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a de facto state religion.  But a case like SL suggests a risk of slippage or 
concept creep in the use of this orienting idea. In the hands of some, the 
requirement for neutrality can expand to suggest that any position-taking 
on the part of the state, the pursuit of any vision of a good society, is a 
mischief.  Issues of religion and education, viewed and understood in the 
frame that I have presented them, point to a distinction worthy of 
identification and commanding attention within the concept of state 
neutrality.  
 The crucial conceptual distinction is this: the state must be neutral 
in its treatment of religion; it need not, however, be neutral about the 
nature of a good society.74  Though its demand for evenhandedness in the 
state treatment of various religions – as well as non-religion and religion – 
is noble and sound, what state neutrality should not be heard to demand 
is the state’s indifference to the conditions for a healthy civic life. Maclure 
and Taylor share this sense of what state neutrality demands, casting the 
point in terms of “constitutive values”: 
 
A liberal and democratic state cannot remain indifferent to 
certain core principles, such as human dignity, basic human 
rights, and popular sovereignty.  These are the constitutive 
values of liberal and democratic political systems; they 
provide these systems with their foundations and aims.75 
 
Although equality of state treatment in matters of religion must be 
assiduously pursued, the demand for state neutrality should not expand 
to require the state to resile from the pursuit of the conditions necessary 
for a just and ethical common world. To concede more to the concept of 
state neutrality invites an unreflective libertarianism, confusing the 
neutral state with an inert state, a public life not permitted to act in the 
interests of its own flourishing.  To claim otherwise is to posit a wholly 
bureaucratic state – a governance structure, not a polity. State action that 
defends and promotes the principles and aims of a democracy 
characterized by freedom, equality, and respect for difference does not 
thereby offend the principle of state neutrality in matters of religion.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Ryder, commenting on Justice LeBel’s dissenting reasons in Congrégation des témoins de 
Jéhovah de St-Jérôme-Lafontaine v Lafontaine (Village), [2004] 2 SCR 650, draws a different 
distinction within the concept of neutrality, that of neutrality between religions as against 
neutrality about religion (supra, note 66). Ryder argues that the Canadian tradition 
supports the state’s affirmative valuation of religion and that “[t]he state’s duty of 
neutrality between religions, in Canadian law…. permits the state to promote, in an even-
handed manner, a religiously-positive pluralism” ("State Neutrality and Freedom of 
Conscience and Religion," 185.). 
75 Maclure and Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience: 11. 
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Of course it matters deeply how the state pursues such principles 
and aims.  If inclusion and respect for diversity are democratic lodestars, 
any state action – including the design of state education – should itself be 
characterized by openness to multiple voices, various perspectives, and 
critical debate.  One should expect modesty from state institutions, 
recognizing that family, community, and culture can be important sources 
of insight and meaning for individuals and ethical resources for society as 
a whole.  That is, indeed, one of the strengths of a pluralist democracy.  
And one would be right to demand due appreciation for the depth of the 
claims involved in matters of religious difference, of the complex ways 
that cultural communities are constituted, and attention to the needs of 
such communities. But so long as those features are in place, the concept 
of state neutrality is not incommensurable with a principled defence of the 
needs and conditions of a just political community.  Courts play an 
important role in insisting on those features and ensuring evenhanded 
treatment of religion.  Yet freed from the burden of a too-capacious 
conception of state neutrality, they can also play the crucial role of clearly 
articulating, for continued assessment and debate, the principles and 
demands of a pluralist democracy.   
The “crisis” with which Arendt was so concerned was a crisis of 
responsibility.  Faced with the many intense interests that constellate 
around education in the context of a religiously diverse society, invocation 
of the idea of neutrality cannot relieve us of the burdens of this 
responsibility.  Neutrality in education cannot suggest that the state stand 
inactive when conscious of the need to ensure the continuance of a 
common social world, and mindful of the interests of children, whose 
autonomy and identity cannot be neatly folded into that of their parents.  
State neutrality in matters of religion does not compel a society agnostic as 
to its own value, health, and needs, nor to the freedom of the children 
who will be charged with sustaining it.   
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